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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia.  We 
identify and test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage:  
assortative matching, compensating parental transfers at marriage, and strategic behavior 
by parents.  We find ample evidence for the first, none for the second, and some evidence 
of the third for brides.  We also find no evidence of competition for parental assets 
among siblings.  Results suggest that parents do not transfer wealth to children in ways 
that compensate for marriage market outcomes.  Certain parents, however, give more 
assets to daughters whenever doing so increases the chances of a daughter marrying a 
wealthy groom. 
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1.  Introduction 
Economic analysis of marriage and the family has grown tremendously since 
Becker￿s (1981) Treatise on the Family.  Phenomena such as family formation, 
intergenerational transfers, and the allocation of resources within the family, previously 
the domain of anthropology and sociology, have increasingly been subject to economic 
investigation (e.g., Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984; Bergstrom 1997; Weiss 1997; Becker 
and Tomes 1986; Behrman 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997).  Marriage, in 
particular, is an institution of great interest since, in many developing countries; it 
represents the union not only of two individuals, but also of two family or kinship groups 
(Rosenzweig and Stark 1989).  Moreover, in many societies, marriage is the occasion for 
a substantial transfer of assets from the parent to the child generation (for example, 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003; Zhang and Chan 1999).  Lastly, recent work testing 
the collective versus the unitary model of household decisionmaking has paid increased 
attention to conditions prevailing at the time of marriage.  In particular, it has been shown 
that the distribution of assets between spouses at the time of marriage acts as a possible 
determinant of bargaining power within marriage (for example, Thomas, Contreras, and 
Frankenberg 1997; Quisumbing and de la BriŁre 2000; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003).  
While it can be argued that assets at marriage do not completely determine the 
distribution of assets upon divorce (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002), these measures 
are, in themselves, worth investigating because they shed light on the institution of 
marriage and inheritance. 
In agrarian societies, marriage is an event of deep economic importance.  First, it 
typically marks the onset not only of a new household but also of a new production unit, 
such as a family farm.  Assets brought to marriage determine the start-up capital of this 
new enterprise.  The success of the enterprise thus depends on what happens on the 
￿marriage market,￿ that is, on the arrangement between the bride, the groom, and their 
respective families regarding the devolution of assets to the newly formed household.  
Farm formation cannot be dissociated from marriage-market considerations.  Second, in 2 
an environment where asset accumulation takes time and is particularly difficult for the 
poor, assets brought to marriage play a paramount role in shaping the lifetime prosperity 
of newly formed households.  Well-married daughters can expect a life of relative 
comfort, while poorly married daughters may spend most of their life in utter poverty.  
Assortative matching between spouses￿the rich marry the rich, the poor marry the 
poor￿not only increases inequality, it reduces social mobility.  Its long-term effects, 
however, may be mitigated by redistributive policies and other avenues of asset 
accumulation during marriage (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003). 
This paper examines the determinants of assets brought to marriage in rural 
Ethiopia.  Two major processes shape what newlyweds bring to the newly formed family 
unit: the matching between spouses with different assets, and parents￿ decisions to endow 
their marrying children with start-up capital.  This paper seeks to assess the relative 
importance of these two processes in arranged marriages such as those encountered in 
rural Ethiopia. 
The importance of the matching process between potential brides and grooms was 
first brought to light by Becker (1981), who argued that a match￿or set of marriages￿is 
an equilibrium if no bride or groom can lure a partner away from a proposed union.  
Becker showed that this simple, intuitive requirement naturally leads to assortative 
matching, whereby the rich marry the rich and the poor marry the poor.  The reason is 
that rich brides can be lured away from poor grooms by rich grooms, but the reverse is 
not true.  Since Becker￿s initial contribution, assortative matching has been studied in 
settings other than the marriage market, including hospitals and sororities (for example, 
Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth 1991, Mongell and Roth 1991, Roth and Sotomayor 1990). 
While marriage markets in developed￿primarily urban￿economies can 
adequately be described as a pure matching process, this is not true for arranged 
marriages in traditional rural societies.  This is because marriage also marks the creation 
of a new farming unit.  At marriage, parents decide not only about the choice of a bride, 
but also how much start-up capital to endow the newlyweds.  What they give nearly 
always constitutes an advanced inheritance.  When giving, parents must balance the 3 
interest of the marrying child against their old-age needs and the inheritance of unmarried 
siblings.  Under fairly general assumptions, this means that parents￿ incentive to give to 
their marrying child is a decreasing function of what is given by the spouse￿s parents.  If 
the groom brings a lot, the bride does not need to bring as much, and the parents can keep 
more for themselves and their other children.  The end result is a ￿compensation effect:￿ 
if the groom brings a lot, the bride brings less. 
Assortative matching and compensating transfers from parents thus operate in 
opposite directions:  while assortative matching generates a positive correlation between 
assets brought to marriage by both spouses, compensating transfers tend to generate a 
negative correlation.  By itself, assortative matching reinforces asset inequality in 
agrarian societies￿or, at the very least, enables it to persist over time.  In contrast, if 
there is no assortative matching, transfers from parents work to equalize assets brought to 
marriage:  a groom from a rich family married to a poor bride would compensate by 
bringing more assets than a groom from a similarly wealthy family married to a rich 
bride.  If the equalizing effect of transfers from parents were to dominate, the marriage 
market would have a strong redistributive effect. 
Transfers from parents can, however, work in the same direction as assortative 
matching if parents act strategically￿that is, if they internalize the effect of their 
transfers on the marriage prospects of their offspring.  The intuition is that parents may 
give more to their daughter if she can attract a wealthier groom.  If parents compete for 
attractive matches on behalf of their offspring, the marriage equilibrium again exhibits 
assortative matching:  children of rich parents marry children of other rich parents.  The 
difference with pure assortative matching, according to Becker, is that assets brought to 
marriage then depend on the ￿slope￿ of marriage prospects: at the margin, parents give 
more if it enables their child to marry a much better prospect. 
This paper investigates these ideas formally.  We analyze how rural society 
endows new couples with the assets they need to set up a farm and family￿typically land 
and livestock, utensils, grains, and consumer durables such as clothing and jewelry.  We 
find that intergenerational transfers take place primarily at the time of marriage.  This is 4 
particularly true for men, to whom most productive assets are bequeathed, whether at 
marriage or afterwards.  We also test whether parents act strategically.  Results suggest 
that assets brought to marriage by brides follow a strategic motive.  This does not hold 
for grooms. 
This paper differs from previous work in several respects.  First, we distinguish 
assortative matching from compensatory transfer motives.
1  Second, we separate factors 
that affect intergenerational transfers from those that reflect the relative scarcity of brides 
and grooms.  Third, many marriage-market studies focus on dowry and bride-price per se, 
that is, on transfers at marriage from one family to the other (for example, Rao 1993, 
Foster 1998).
2  Here, we examine the totality of assets brought to marriage, whether these 
were acquired from parents or other sources prior to marriage, or received at the time of 
marriage.  This more inclusive measure is more appropriate in rural Ethiopia because 
gifts from the families to each other and to the couple account for a small proportion of 
assets brought to marriage.  The main purpose of these gifts seems to be to seal the 
marriage and cover the cost of the wedding rather than to endow the new couple.  This 
lesson should be kept in mind when conducting marriage-market studies in other African 
countries. 
Ethiopia is an ideal site for studying marriage customs, since it is characterized by 
extensive agroecological and ethnic diversity.  Different religions, with widely divergent 
views regarding matrimonial issues and the status of women, are well represented and 
tend to dominate different parts of the country￿the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia in the 
north, Sunni Muslims in the east and west, recently converted Protestants in the South, 
and animist believers in parts of the south.  The ethnic and cultural makeup of the country 
is also quite varied, with Semitic traditions in the north, Cushitic traditions in the south 
                                                 
1 Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) focused on developing an index for ranking spouses in the marriage 
market and examining the determinants of transfers at marriage.  The study did not examine the issue of 
compensatory transfers. 
2 Zhang and Chan (1999) argue that in Taiwan, dowry is paid directly to the bride and is held by her in sole 
ownership.  Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) showed that this is not the case in the study area, where 
bride-price and dowry per se are very small, compared to assets brought to marriage by the spouses. 5 
and east, and Nilotic traditions in the west.  Climatic and ecological variation is equally 
high, given the mountainous terrain and the fact that the country stretches from the dry 
Sahel to the humid equatorial zone.  Finally, local traditions have remained largely 
untouched, given the lack of roads and the relative isolation of the countryside. 
Some research already exists on marriage-market issues in rural Ethiopia.  Control 
over assets during marriage and devolution of assets upon divorce or death have been 
studied in detail (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002).  The study showed that most assets 
brought to marriage are held jointly and managed by the household head.  A more recent 
study (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003) demonstrated that assortative matching is quite 
strong in the study area.  Assets brought to marriage are positively associated with 
parents￿ wealth, indicating that a bequest motive affects assets at marriage.  We organize 
our model and empirical analysis around these earlier findings, but emphasize 
compensatory transfers and strategic behavior in this paper. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the conceptual framework 
and testing strategy.  A brief description of the survey and the survey area follows in 
Section 3, which also examines the determinants of the value of assets brought to 
marriage by the bride and groom.  We show that intergenerational transfer considerations 
affect the aggregate amount transferred to the new family unit.  The distribution of assets 
at marriage between spouses is analyzed as a function of personal, parental, and 
marriage-market characteristics.  The last section offers the conclusion. 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
The starting point of our enquiry is a model of compensating transfers from 
parents to children at the time of marriage.  Marriage-market analysis often focuses on all 
the assets brought to marriage by spouses, including health, education, and patrimonial 
assets (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003).  We focus instead on a narrower issue:  
patrimonial transfers that take place at and around marriage, conditional on investments 
already made in the long-term health and education of the spouses.  Our model resembles 6 
a standard bequest model, except that interpretation is slightly different since the transfer 
takes place inter vivos.  Let the assets brought to marriage by the groom and bride be 
written µ and β, respectively.  Without loss of generality, we focus on the groom￿s 
problem. 
Marriage and Inter Vivos Transfers 
Taking β as given, we focus on the choice of µ.  Parents have initial wealth w
p, 
while the child has initial personal wealth w
c.  Parents decide how much of their wealth to 
transfer to their son.
3  This transfer is denoted τ.  Parents are altruistic, and care about 
their own utility v(.) and that of their marrying child u(.).  Their combined utility is of the 
form 
  u(w
p - τ) + wv(w
c + τ + β), 
where u(.) and v(.) are concave increasing functions and w is a welfare weight.  For 
simplicity, we assume that u(x) = v(x) = x
p.  Since µ = w
c + τ, it follows that τ = µ - w
c, 
and thus that 
  w
p - τ = w
p + w
c - µ .  (1) 
Let the combined wealth of the groom and his parents be denoted 
pc ww µ ≡ + .  We 
assume that the groom￿s parents and the bride￿s parents transfer a nonnegative amount to 
their children.
4  This means that µ ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.  In the context of rural Ethiopia, this is 
                                                 
3 It is also conceivable that parents require transfers from their children in order to legitimize marriage and 
ensure access to lineage land (Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988).  Our model applies to this 
case as well. 
4 This is equivalent to assuming that groom￿s parents cannot extort payment from the bride￿s parents 
simply to allow them to marry. This assumption can be justified if participation in the marriage market is 
voluntary. Brides and grooms can avoid extortion by eloping. 7 
an appropriate assumption.
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≡ .  What parents give to their son 
is an increasing function of their combined wealth but a decreasing function of what the 
bride brings to the marriage β.  The bride￿s parents solve a similar problem that yields the 
interior solution: 
 
* 0 cd ββµ = −≥ , (5) 
where β  is the combined wealth of the bride and her parents and β
* similarly decreases 
with assets brought by the groom.  This is the substitution effect discussed in the 
introduction.  In the population we study, brides bring few assets to marriage.  In the 
context of our model, this can be represented by a smaller welfare weight for brides.  We 
therefore expect that c < a and d < b. 
We now examine the Nash equilibrium of the transfer game between parents.  
Equations (4) and (5) describe the behavior of the groom￿s and bride￿s parents when they 
                                                 
5 In our model, what parents give is used as start-up capital by the newly formed household.  Even though 
there might be exceptions, dowry payments in other parts of the world, such as India, largely fall within this 
general category, provided we include consumer durables. 8 
both give, and can easily be solved jointly.  The resulting equilibrium configuration is as 
follows: 
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Assortative Matching 
We are now ready to examine the matching process between all potential brides 
and grooms.  We assume all parents have the same utility and thus the same decision 
functions.  By plugging equilibrium values of µ
* and β
* from 2.6 into the utility function 
of both parents, we can compute the utility of all possible matches.  Matching can then 
proceed as in Becker (1981). 
Problems of this sort are referred to as two-sided matching (for example, Shapley 
and Shubik 1972; Demange and Gale 1985; Gale and Shapley 1962; Gale 2001; Alkan 
and Gale 1990; Roth and Sotomayor 1990).  Substituting the Nash equilibrium into the 
parents￿ utility function, we see that the utility of the groom￿s family is increasing in the 
wealth of the bride￿s family, regardless of the groom￿s family wealth.  Consequently, the 
grooms agree on the ranking of brides and vice versa.  Using the approach pioneered by 
Shapley and Shubik (1972) and extended by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), it should be 
possible to show that there is a unique stable equilibrium that involves perfect assortative 
matching on wealth.  Although a formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper, the same 
perfect assortative outcome should obtain irrespective of who moves first, as long as we 
use the right kind of algorithm (for example, Roth and Sotomayor 1988; Mongell and 9 
Roth 1991; Roth and VandeVate 1990; Board 1994).
6  The only caveat concerns the 
incomplete ranking of brides and grooms.  This is because zero β and zero µ create ties:  
a groom with initial wealth µ  is indifferent between all brides for whom β = 0.  To 
resolve these ties, we assume random assignment. 
To illustrate how transfers from parents statistically affect the distribution of 
wealth across newlyweds, we construct a simple Monte Carlo simulation exercise based 
on the following algorithm.  For a given population of brides and grooms, an equilibrium 
match is computed by letting the groom￿s parents sequentially choose the bride who 
yields the highest utility.  Since the order of play should not matter, we assume that 
parents with the highest µ  choose first, parents with the next highest µ  move next, and 
parents with the lowest µ  move last.  When the parents of a groom are indifferent 
between several brides because they bring the same β, they are assumed to choose one at 
random.  The match is an equilibrium because the bride married to the highest groom has 
a high combined value µ + β and could not obtain a higher utility with another groom.  
Applying this argument recursively to all brides, it should be true that no alternative 
allocation exists by which a bride and a groom would both be willing to switch.  This is 
because no one could guarantee himself or herself a utility higher than the one guaranteed 
by the solution to this algorithm. 
The above algorithm is applied to M randomly generated populations of brides 
and groom.  We posit values for ω and σ, which are held constant across all M 
replications.  For each replication, we select N random realizations of µ  and β  from a 
uniform distribution.  For each pair of realizations of  i µ  and  j β , we compute 
*(, ) ij µ µβ  
and 
*(,) ji β βµ using equation (6).  We then compute the value of this union to the 
parents of the bride and groom: 
 
*
, (, (,) ) ij i j i UU µ ββµ =  
                                                 




, (,(,) ) ji j i j VV β µµβ = . 
We recursively apply the algorithm described in the previous paragraph to match all 
brides and grooms.
7  The solution is a series of matched pairs 
** {,} ij µ β . 
The statistical part of the Monte Carlo simulation regresses transfers on each 
other.  Noise is added to the data to represent the effect of various random factors not 
included in our model.
8  To illustrate the contradictory effects of parental transfers and 
assortative matching on the correlation between µ
* and β
*, we regress µ
* first on β
* alone, 
and then on β
* and µ  jointly. 
Monte Carlo simulation results are summarized in Table 1 for various values of 
parameter σ.  Results show that the simple correlation between µ
* and β
* depends on σ.  
If the elasticity of substitution σ between children and parents is high in the parents￿ 
utility function, µ
* and β
* tend to be negatively correlated:  the substitution effect more 
than compensates for the assortative matching effect.  In contrast, if σ is low, µ
* and β
* 
tend to be positively correlated.  Consequently, observing a positive correlation between 
assets brought to marriage does not, by itself, rule out the existence of parental transfers.  
Once we control for initial wealth, the conditional correlation between µ
* and β
* is 
always negative.  Estimating Model 2 in Table 1, using real data, should therefore tell us 
whether parents reduce inter vivos transfers when the bride brings more wealth. 
                                                 
7 In practice, we proceed as follows.  Let grooms be ranked by wealth so that 
12 N µ µµ >>> K .  We start 
by allocating to 
1 µ  the bride who gives utility 
*
11 (, (,) )
j U µ ββµ .  In practice, this is the one with the 
highest  β , unless all brides contribute nothing (β
* = 0).  In this case, parents are indifferent and a bride is 
chosen randomly from the set of equivalent matches.  The matched bride is then removed from the list of 
potential matches, and we move to the next groom.  The process is repeated until the last groom has been 
matched with the last bride. 
8 In practice, we regress µ
* on β
* and  ￿ µ µε ≡ + , where ε is measurement error.  This is meant to capture 
the idea that the econometrician only has an imperfect measure of initial wealth.  Without measurement 
error, a perfect fit is obtained in many cases, which is unrealistic. 11 
Table 1￿Results of Monte Carlo simulations
a 
  σ = 0.2  σ = 1.5 
  ￿ [] Eb  ￿ [] Var b   ￿ [] Eb  ￿ [] Var b  
A.  Groom      
 Model 1: 
**
ii i ab µβ ε =+ +  1.475 0.376  -6.402 2.047 
 Model 2: 
**
ii i i ab c µβ µ ε =+ + +   -0.372 0.092  -0.598 0.169 
B.  Bride      
 Model 1: 
**
ii i ab βµ υ =+ +  0.520 0.158  -0.234 0.083 
 Model 2: 
**
ii i i ab c βµ β υ =+ + +   -0.421 0.086  -0.734 0.077 
a These simulation results were obtained using M = 100 replications, each with N = 60 pairs of 
brides and grooms. Parental assets  and µ β  are generated independently, using a [0,100] 
uniform distribution. Welfare weights are 1 of grooms and 0.3 for brides. To avoid a perfect fit, 
noise is added to  and µ β  after matching, using a uniform distribution [-5,5]. The true values 
of b are ￿0.5 for grooms and ￿0.56 for brides when σ = 0.2, and -0.5 and -0.81 when σ = 1.5. 
 
 
Suppose, in contrast, that parents do not make compensatory transfers.
9  In this 
case, assortative matching is the only force at work and sorting according to 
* and µ µ  
coincide.  This ensures that high µ  grooms are matched with high β  brides.  In this 
case, regressing µ
* on µ  and β
* yields a significant coefficient for µ  and 0 for β
*.  
However, if µ  is measured with error, as is likely, the correlation between µ
* and β
* 
remains positive once we control forµ .  This is because β
* contains additional 
                                                 
9 Formally, suppose that parents solve
1
max 0 [( ) ( ) ]
ρρ µµ µµ ω µ
ρ
≤≤ − + .  The solution is of the 
form
* () µµ µ = , where µ(.) is a monotonic increasing function.  In this case, sorting according to µ
* is 
equivalent to sorting according toµ . 12 
information about unobservables through assortative matching.
10  This possibility must 
be kept in mind in the empirical estimation. 
A test of compensatory transfers at marriage can thus be constructed by 
estimating equations (4) and (5).  If only assortative matching is present, the coefficients 
of β
* and µ
* will be zero or￿in case we do not measure endowments  and µ β  
completely accurately￿positive.  If, however, parents transfer fewer assets when the 
spouse brings more, the coefficient on β
* and µ
* should become negative once we control 
for  and µ β .  Estimating equations (4) and (5) forms the basis of our testing strategy. 
Reciprocity 
Other explanations have been proposed to account for assortative matching, most 
notably the idea of reciprocity.  Suppose that groom￿s parents move first and arrange a 
match.  The bride￿s parents then reciprocate by bringing as much as they can as a sign of 
goodwill to improve the ex post quality of the match.  The anthropological literature 
seems to suggest that this is an important motive in the setting of dowry payments.
11 
The expectation of reciprocity increases the incentive for the groom￿s parents to 
give more.  This is because what the bride brings￿β
*￿is an increasing function of what 
they give￿β
* = β(µ
*).  Reciprocity could even work both ways with µ
* = µ(β
*).
12  The 
                                                 
10 We have 




* = m + nµ
* + υ.  Consequently, 
* ￿ () mn mn β µυ µε υ = ++ = + − + , from which we 
obtain that 
* ￿ () / mn ε βυ µ −= − − = .  We thus have 
** ￿ () / mn µµ εβ υ =−= −− :  the regression only 
captures assortative matching, hence  ￿ µ  drops out and the coefficient on β
* is always positive.  If β
* is also 
measured with error,  ￿ µ  may contain information that is not included in β
* and may be significant as well. 
11 If reciprocity is a motive, the behavior of parents is reminiscent of the way most people play the trust 
game in the experimental economics literature (Henrich et al. 2002, Barr 2002).  The person who has 
received reciprocates, even though it is against her interest in a one-shot game. 
12 From a formal point of view, the reciprocity motive is reminiscent of the Stackelberg model of oligopoly:  
one player￿here, the groom￿takes into account the reaction function of the other.  If both players take 
into account the reaction function of the other, the resulting equilibrium often coincides with the simple 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  This requires further research. 13 
reciprocity motive therefore tends to reinforce the correlation between assets brought by 
spouses:  if the groom brings more, so does the bride. 
Given the data at our disposal, we do not observe the negotiation process.  
Consequently, it is impossible for us to distinguish reciprocity from assortative matching.  
This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Strategic Behavior 
So far, we have assumed that parents do not adjust transfers at marriage to 
improve the ranking of their son or daughter in the marriage market.  If parents act 
strategically in this sense, equation (6) no longer represents their optimal behavior.  
Overbidding by parents to improve marriage-market outcomes must be taken into 
account.  Suppose parents realize that the ranking of their offspring on the marriage 
market can be manipulated by increasing the size of the transfer or bequest.  In this case, 
a lower-ranked bride may seek to attract a better-ranked groom by bidding more than is 
dictated by equation (6).  The reason for doing so is that parental utility increases with the 
quality of the match, even though￿conditional on a match￿it decreases when the 
transfer is larger than β
*.  Intuitively, parents should be more willing to overbid￿that is, 
to transfer more than is dictated by equation (6)￿if the quality of the match increases a 
great deal with overbidding.  If the ￿price￿ of a better match is much higher than that of a 
low match, parents should be less inclined to overbid. 
A formal treatment of such a model would take us too far from our main focus, 
which is empirical.  It is, nevertheless, possible to get a flavor of the resulting outcome by 
considering an economy with two grooms and two brides.  Order them so 
that 12 12 and µ µβ β >> .  Assume that welfare weights, ω, are such that brides bring less 
to marriage than grooms.  As a result, brides have more to gain from switching rank.  We 
therefore focus on the strategic behavior of brides.  Without strategic bidding, the utility 
of Bride 2￿s parents for each possible marriage is 14 
 
** *
2,2 2 2,2 2,2 2,2
1
[( ) ( ) ] V
ρ ρ ββ ω µ β
ρ
=− ++, (7) 
 
** *
2,1 2 2,1 1,2 2,1
1
[( ) ( ) ] V
ρ ρ ββ ω µ β
ρ
=− + +, (8) 
where 
**
,, , and ij j i µ β  are the assets brought to marriage when groom i is matched with 
bride j.  Since  12 µ µ > , in general, 
**
1,2 2,2 2,1 2,2 andV V µµ >> .  Other things being equal, 
V2,1 ￿ V2,2 is an increasing function of 
**
1,2 2,2 µ µ − :  the more Groom 1 brings to marriage 
relative to Groom 2, the more Bride 2 prefers Groom 1. 
For simplicity, suppose there is no tie, so that Groom 1 strictly prefers Bride 1.
13  
The question is whether Bride 2 can lure Groom 1 away from Bride 1.  The maximum 
max




22 , 1 1 , 22 , 1 2 , 2
1
[( ) ( ) ] V
ρρ ββ ω µ β
ρ
−+ + = . (9) 
It immediately follows that 
max *
2,1 2,1 β β >  and that 
max
2,1 β  is an increasing function of 
*
1,2 µ  
and a decreasing function of V2,2.
15  In order to keep Groom 1, Bride 1 must bring just a 
bit more than 
max
2,1 β .  Since by assumption,  12 β β > , doing so is less costly for the parents 
of Bride 1 than for the parents of Bride 2.  The end result is that Bride 1 keeps Groom 1, 
                                                 
13 This requires that 
**
12 β β >  and, thus, that 
*
1 0 β > . 
14 Strictly speaking, we should allow Groom 1 to adjust 
*
1,2 µ  but this complication is ignored for the sake of 
this simple presentation.  All we need is that 
*
1,2 µ  remains higher than 
*
2,2 µ . 
15 This is easily seen by totally differentiating equation (9).  For instance, for V2,2, we obtain (dropping 
some of the notation for improved reading) 
max













* and ρ < 1 by construction, the numerator is negative, which proves the claim. 15 
but what Bride 1 brings to marriage is 
max
2,1 β , which is an increasing function of 
*
1,2 µ  and a 
decreasing function of V2,2, the utility of the lower-ranked bride.  Since V2,2 is itself an 
increasing function of 
*
2,2 µ , it follows that 
max
2,1 β  is increasing in the difference between 
*
1,2 µ  and 
*
2,2 µ .  What the top bride brings to marriage increases if the difference between 
the two grooms is large, that is, if the slope of the marriage market is steep. 
This heuristic treatment of a 2 × 2 case illustrates that the resulting equilibrium 
will not satisfy equations (4) and (5).  The model can be extended to an N × N matching 
game by applying the above treatment recursively, starting from the lowest-ranked bride.  
The resulting model resembles a two-sided auction-like game in which brides (and 
grooms) bring to marriage just as much as could credibly be offered by the next best 
bride.
16  In this world, β and µ also depend on the slope of the marriage market.  If the 
difference between grooms is large relative to the difference between brides, brides must 
bring more to fend off competition from lower-ranked brides who wish to improve their 
ranking.  In the last part of this paper, we test this idea empirically. 
Parents may also seek to affect the welfare of their daughter during marriage by 
transferring assets to her in person (Zhang and Chan 1999).  Assets held in sole 
ownership by the wife are expected to raise her bargaining power during marriage.  As 
we have shown earlier (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002), this does not appear to be the 
case in rural Ethiopia.  Brides bring little to marriage, and whatever they bring tends to be 
controlled by the household head, who is typically male.  Livestock held in sole 
ownership by the bride, for instance, is likely to be shared equally between spouses upon 
no-fault divorce.  Consequently, we ignore this complication here. 
                                                 
16 Since 
max
2,1 β  is a decreasing function of V2,2, in the case of multiple brides, it is the utility of the lowest-
ranked bride that determines 
max
2,1 β .  However, an offer to give 
max
2,1 β  need not be credible in this case if the 
lowest-ranked bride could obtain a higher utility at lower cost from a lower-ranked male.  This illustrates 
that the strategic equilibrium could be quite complicated.  Such complications are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 16 
In the rest of this paper, we estimate equations (4) and (5), and we test whether 
the coefficient on β and µ are negative.  If they are, this constitutes evidence that parents 
transfer wealth to their marrying children in part to compensate for assets brought by the 
spouse.  If the coefficients are positive, this constitutes evidence that parents do not take 
into account spouse assets when transferring assets to their child at marriage.  In this 
case, the relationship between µ and β in equation (4) is entirely driven by assortative 
matching and reciprocity. 
A positive relationship may also result if parents act strategically.  In this case, it 
is due to strategic bidding by parents who bid more if it helps them match their child with 
a more richly endowed spouse.  In the empirical part of this paper, we seek to distinguish 
between these two alternative explanations by controlling for strategic bidding directly.  
This is achieved by using the slope of the marriage matching relationship ∂µ/∂β as 
additional regressor.  If strategic bidding is a consideration for brides, parents are 
expected to give more if they can leverage a higher quality spouse￿that is, if ∂µ/∂β is 
high. 
3.  Study Site and Survey Description 
Having presented the conceptual framework and outlined the testing strategy, we 
apply these ideas to marriage outcomes in rural Ethiopia.  The choice of country is 
dictated by the fact that Ethiopia is primarily an agrarian economy where how one fares 
in the marriage market is an important determinant of welfare.  Ethiopia is indeed a low-
income, drought-prone economy with the third largest population on the African 
continent.  While some work has been done on South Asia (Foster 1998) and West Africa 
(Jacoby 1995), very little is known about marriage markets in East Africa.  An additional 
attraction of Ethiopia as a study site is that it has extensive agroecological and ethnic 
diversity, with over 85 ethnic groups and allegiance to most major world and animist 
religions (Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes 1992).  This diversity should provide enough 
variety in marriage-market outcomes to identify important determinants. 17 
For our analysis, we rely on the 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), 
which was undertaken by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University 
(AAU) in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and 
the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford University.  The 1997 
ERHS covered approximately 1,500 households in 15 villages across Ethiopia, capturing 
much of the diversity mentioned above.  While sample households within villages were 
randomly selected, the choice of villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the 
major farming systems were represented.  Thus, while the 15 sites included in the sample 
may not be statistically representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, they are quite 
representative of its agroecological, ethnic, and religious diversity. 
The questionnaire used in the 1997 round includes a set of fairly standard core 
modules, supplemented with modules specifically designed to address intrahousehold 
allocation issues, particularly conditions at the time of marriage.  These modules were 
designed not only to be consistent with information gathered in the core modules, but 
also to complement individual-specific information.  These modules were pretested by 
the authors in February and March 1997 in four non-survey sites with levels of ethnic and 
religious diversity similar to the sample.  Data collection took place between May and 
December 1997.  Questionnaires were administered in several separate visits by 
enumerators who resided in survey villages for several months.  Careful data cleaning 
and reconciliation across rounds were undertaken in 1998 and 1999 by Bereket Kebede 
and IFPRI staff. 
The intrahousehold modules collect information on the parental background, 
marriage histories, and premarital human and physical capital of each spouse and the 
circumstances surrounding the marriage￿for example, type of marriage contract and 
involvement in the choice of a spouse.  A variety of assets brought to the marriage were 
recorded, as well as all transfers made at the time of marriage.  These questions, which 
were asked separately for each union listed by the household head, pertained to assets 
brought to marriage by the head and his spouse or spouses, or, if the household head was 
female, for herself and her last husband.  Questions were as exhaustive as possible; they 18 
covered the value and quantity of land and livestock, as well as the value of jewelry, 
linen, clothing, grains, and utensils that each spouse brought to marriage.  In the analysis, 
values at the time of marriage are converted to current values, using the consumer price 
index.  Given the difficulties inherent in a long recall period and the choice of an inflation 
correction factor suitable for all 15 villages, these values are likely to be measured with 
error.  We also collected information on the value of the house brought to marriage by 
each spouse, if any.  Although questions were asked about cash as well, they yielded very 
few responses, if any.  This is because accumulation in the form of cash or financial 
instruments is essentially absent in the study area.  Questions were asked about transfers 
from the bride￿s and groom￿s families at the time of marriage, whether to the couple or a 
specific individual.  Parental background information was collected for each spouse and 
each union; these included landholdings of the parents at the time the household head was 
married and the educational attainment of each parent of each spouse.  Human capital 
characteristics of each spouse included age, education, and experience in three categories 
of work prior to marriage:  farmwork, wage work, and self-employment. 
One asset, land, deserves a few words of caution.  For some 20 years prior to the 
survey, rural land was owned by the Ethiopian state and distributed to individual farmers 
by the Peasants￿ Association (PA), a local authority operating at the village level.  Land 
is then periodically reallocated between farmers to accommodate the needs of young 
couples.  Between these reallocations, farmers hold full user rights on the land.  In 
practice, reallocations have occurred rather infrequently.  Different regions also seem to 
have interpreted the law differently, some opting for a collectivist approach, while others 
essentially followed the old system of inheritance (for example, World Bank 1998, Gopal 
and Salim 1999).  Young couples typically obtain land through their parents, either 
directly (gift or land loan) or indirectly by having their parents lobby the PA.  Although 
the sale of agricultural land has been illegal in Ethiopia for over 20 years, virtually all 
surveyed households were able to value the land they had brought to marriage.  This 
leads us to suspect that parents continue to determine the land base of newly formed 
couples in rural Ethiopia. 19 
Table 2 breaks down the sample by household category.  We see that 20 percent 
of surveyed households are headed by unmarried individuals, most often divorced or 
widowed women.  Monogamous couples living together represent some 62 percent of the 
sample.  Polygamous households￿or parts thereof￿account for 7.6 percent of the 
sample, while separated couples account for the remaining 9 percent.  Starting from these 
household-level data, we construct a marriage data set that contains information recorded 
for each union separately.  The rest of the analysis presented here is based on this union-
level data set. 
Table 2￿Composition of the sample, by category of household 
  Number Percent Total 
Unmarried individuals       
  
 Single man living alone  72  5.1   
  Single woman living alone  239  16.8   
  Total unmarried individuals      21.9 
Monogamous couples       
  Monogamous couple living together  877  61.8   
  Monogamous couple, husband away  69  4.9   
  Monogamous couple, wife away  55  3.9   
  Total monogamous couples      70.5 
Polygamous households       
  Polygamous household living together  81  5.7   
  Male-headed part of a polygamous couple, residing separately  21  1.5   
  Female-headed part of a polygamous couple, residing separately  6  0.4   
  Total polygamous households      7.6 
Total sample  1,420    100.0 
 
 
Survey results show that grooms bring nearly 10 times more assets than brides to 
the newly formed family unit (Table 3), an average of 4,270 birr (in 1997 prices), 
compared to 430 birr for brides. For grooms, land is the asset with the highest average 
value. The next most valuable asset is livestock, followed by grain stocks and other minor 
assets. In contrast, brides bring very little land to the marriage. They bring some 
livestock, but less than grooms. Two-thirds of the brides report bringing no asset to 
marriage. Gifts at the time of marriage are distributed more evenly between the groom 20 
and the bride. These are very small relative to assets brought to marriage, except for the 
bride, where they are roughly equivalent. The survey area can thus be described as a 
system where grooms bring most of the start-up capital of the newly formed household. 
Table 3￿Assets at marriage, inheritance, human capital, and parental characteristics 
  Groom￿s assets    Bride￿s assets 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median   Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median
Assets  brought  to  marriage           
  Land value  2,056  5,955  377    90  833  0 
  Livestock value  1,337  2,833  287    300  1,790  0 
  Jewelry, clothes, linens, utensils, grain  877  1,587  448    40  232  0 
  Total value of assets prior to marriage  4,270  7,433  1,981    430  2,035  0 
  Gifts at marriage
a 234  761  0    401  885  0 
Inheritance after marriage               
  Inherited land  2,060  8,452  0    75  657  0 
  Inherited livestock  260  1,038  0    80  346  0 
Total assets at marriage plus inheritance  6,820  11,848  3,576    987 2,395 342 
Human  capital           
  Age at marriage  29.9  11.7  27.3    19.3  8.1  18.3 
  Literate
b  33%   0%    13%   0% 
  At least some primary education  25%    0%    10%    0% 
  At least some secondary education  7%    0%    2%    0% 
  Years of farming experience  11.7  10.3  10.0    3.7  5.8  1.0 
  Years of wage work experience 0.7  2.5  0.0    0.1  0.7  0.0 
  Years of self-employment experience 0.8  2.9  0.0    0.3  1.5  0.0 
Parental characteristics               
  Father￿s land (hectares)  6.5  74.0  0.6    1.9  9.9  0.4 
  Father went to school (yes = 1)  7%    0%    7%    0% 
Number  of  observations  1,179          
Notes: All unions are included, and all values are expressed in 1997 Ethiopian birr. 
a These are gifts made to bride and groom only. A few gifts given to both jointly are divided equally for the purpose of 
this table. 
b This means either some formal education or some literacy or religious education. 
 
4.  Estimation Results 
We can now proceed with estimation of equations (4) and (5).  For a couple with 
husband i and wife j, the model to be estimated is of the form:  
  0 ii i i ji abu µ µβ = ++ ≥  (10) 

















































To capture the fact that parents give much less to brides than to grooms, we let welfare 
weights differ for brides and grooms. 
From equation (1), we know that 
pc
ii i ww µ ≡ + .  We measure parental wealth, 
p
i w , 
using a parental wealth ranking,
17 land owned by parents, and father￿s education.  To 
avoid spurious correlation, we measure 
c
i w  primarily in terms of human capital:  
schooling, age at marriage, and work experience at marriage.  These variables are 
predetermined, and are not affected by compensating parental transfers at the time of 
marriage.
18  We also include the number of previous marriages because we suspect that 
they affect asset accumulation before a new marriage, particularly for women.  The 
number of times a spouse has been widowed is included as additional regressor because 
widows and widowers customarily inherit from their deceased spouse (Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing 2002).  The number of children from previous marriages is included because 
                                                 
17 Respondents were asked to rank the wealth of their parents into five categories, from poor to rich. 
18 The emphasis of our analysis is on the transfer of assets to the bride and groom at the time of marriage, 
conditional on the human capital that they bring to marriage.  While it could be argued that variables such 
as age at marriage, number of unions, and number of children from previous unions are endogenous, our 
aim is to include regressors that would explain the variation in what the spouse brings to the marriage.  At 
the time of marriage, these variables cannot be changed.  The key regressor of interest￿which will be 
instrumented￿is the assets brought by the other spouse. 22 
what a divorced or widowed wife receives depends on whether or not she has children to 
care for (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002).  We also control for the geographical origin 
of spouses.  While men typically stay in the village of their birth upon marriage, wives 
often come from another village.  We expect spouses originating from outside the village 
to bring fewer assets, especially land.  Seventeen village dummies are included as well. 
The dependent variables, µi and βj, are the value of all assets brought to marriage 
by the bride and the groom; they are constructed as described in the previous section.  
They include the value of all the physical assets that form the start-up capital of the newly 
created household.  Sample correlation coefficients between µi and βj are significantly 
positive.  This is consistent with assortative matching and reciprocity, and does not 
support the idea of compensating parental transfers with a large value of σ.  To test 
compensating transfers, it is therefore necessary to rely on equations (10) and (11).  The 
model is estimated in logs to limit the effect of outliers.  Assets brought by the spouse 
and father￿s land also enter the regression in logs.  The estimator is tobit. 
Regression estimates are reported in Table 4.  We obtain large positive values for 
bi and dj.  This constitutes prima facie rejection of the compensating transfers model 
presented in Section 2.  Parental wealth has a positive effect on assets brought to 
marriage by both bride and groom, while parental education has no effect.  The latter 
result is hardly surprising, since the average education level of parents is quite low.  
Moreover, study areas remain centered primarily on traditional agriculture, where returns 
to education are low or nonexistent.  Farming experience has a positive effect on assets 
brought to marriage, reflecting individual accumulation by the spouses.  Experience in 
wage work is negative for men, suggesting that men who work for a wage are less 
capable of accumulating assets than farmers. 
For women, we find that experience in self-employment is associated with higher 
values of assets at marriage.  This is hardly surprising. In the study area, as in much of 
Africa, off-farm work is the primary￿if not only￿avenue through which women can 
earn an independent income.  Widows and women with children from previous marriages 23 
Table 4￿Assets brought to marriage 
  (estimator is tobit; dependent variable in log) 
   Groom    Bride 
  Unit Coefficient  t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Assets brought by spouse             
 Value of assets brought by spouse  log  0.234 6.93    0.433 5.23 
Determinants of parental and personal wealth             
 Parent￿s wealth ranking  rank  1-5  0.267 2.56    0.389 1.65 
 Land of father 
a  log  0.132 1.28    0.475 2.04 
 Years of education of father  years  -0.180  -0.55    -0.244  -0.34 
 Age at marriage  years  0.005  0.55    0.023  1.12 
 Number of previous marriages  no.  times  0.078 0.91    0.238 0.92 
 Years of schooling  years  0.018  0.45    -0.023  -0.14 
 Years of farming experience  log  0.412  3.72    -0.216  -1.00 
 Years of wage work experience  log  -0.352  -2.52    0.963  1.16 
 Years of self-employment experience  log  0.162  1.21    0.869  1.90 
 Widowhood  no. times  0.180  0.84    1.914  3.78 
 Children from previous marriage(s)  number        0.393  4.94 
 Born in village    (omitted category) 
 Born in district  yes = 1  -0.308  -1.13    -0.609  -1.24 
 Born in province  yes = 1  -0.470  -1.23    -0.152  -0.24 
 Born in another rural area  yes = 1  -0.859  -2.42    -1.889  -2.45 
 Born in a town or city  yes = 1  2.894  1.13    3.594  3.06 
 Village dummies    (included but not shown) 
 Intercept    3.286  5.30    -3.523  -2.90 
 Pseudo R-squared    0.036      0.139   
 Number of observations    971      1,102   
 of which censored    86      676   
 of which uncensored    885      426   
a See text for details. 
 
 
bring more assets to marriage, a result in line with our earlier findings (Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing 2003). 
Parents presumably divide their assets among their children so that, other things 
being equal, grooms with more brothers and sisters receive less. Competition among 
siblings may be correlated with matching outcomes in such a way as to invalidate our 
results. To test for this possibility, we reestimate the model with sibling effects. We 
assume that welfare weights vary as a function of the number of siblings. In practice, this 
means that ai and bi vary systematically with the number of siblings of the groom. This 
effect is captured by including cross terms between number of siblings and  i µ  and βj. 
The same applies to brides. Because daughters bring much less to marriage, we focus on 24 
competition with brothers.
19  To keep the model sparse, we only include the most 
important cross terms. 
Results with sibling effects are presented in Table 5.  The number of brothers is 
shown to have no effect on assets brought to marriage, suggesting that sibling 
competition is not an important concern in the study area.
20  Contrary to expectations, we 
find that parental land crossed with number of siblings has a positive sign in both cases.  
The effect is significant for brides.  This means that brides with more brothers receive 
more from their parents.  This may be because siblings, particularly brothers who are 
more likely to be gainfully engaged in farming or other work, indirectly contribute to the 
marriage as well.
21  According to expectations, we find that βj and µi crossed with 
siblings have negative signs: spouses with more siblings bring less to marriage if their 
spouse brings more.  But the effect is not significant.  Sibling effects are not jointly 
significant for grooms. 
For inference based on equations (10) and (11) to yield correct conclusions, the 
complete vector of  and ij µ β  must be observable.  If not, matching on unobservables in 
the marriage market will ensure that assets brought by the bride are positively correlated 
with unobservable assets of the groom.  The presence of incomplete measurement in  i µ  
therefore biases the coefficient of βi in equation (10) toward being positive.  Whenever 
the dependent variable µi and regressor βj are positively correlated because of matching 
on unobservables, the coefficient of βj is biased toward a positive value.  The same thing 
happens for µi in equation (11).  For our test to be conclusive, it is therefore necessary to 
instrument βj and µi in their respective regression. 
                                                 
19 We also experimented with the number of sisters, but they are never significant. 
20 Competition from male siblings is more important in the case of inheritance, where a deceased person￿s 
estate is divided among all heirs at the same time (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003). 
21 In contrast, in Bangladesh, the number of brothers decreases the wife￿s assets at marriage, but has 
positive effects on current assets (Quisumbing and de la BriŁre 2000) and on child health (Hallman 1998). 25 
Table 5￿Testing sibling effects 
  (estimator is tobit; dependent variable in log) 
   Groom    Bride 
  Unit Coefficient  t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Assets brought by spouse             
 Value of assets brought by spouse  log  0.274 4.87    0.577 3.70 
Determinants of parental and personal wealth             
 Parent￿s wealth ranking  rank  1-5  0.270 2.59    0.400 1.71 
 Land of father 
a  log  -0.071 -0.43    -0.413 -0.94 
 Years of education of father  years  -0.161  -0.49    -0.252  -0.36 
 Age at marriage  years  0.006  0.65    0.022  1.06 
 Number of previous marriages  no.  times  0.084 0.98    0.246 0.96 
 Years of schooling  years  0.016  0.38    -0.025  -0.15 
 Years of farming experience  log  0.401  3.61    -0.202  -0.94 
 Years of wage work experience  log  -0.368  -2.62    1.054  1.27 
 Years of self-employment experience  log  0.156  1.17    0.858  1.89 
 Widowhood  no. times  0.175  0.82    1.921  3.81 
 Children from previous marriage(s)  number        0.390  4.93 
 Born in village    (omitted category)       
 Born in district  yes = 1  -0.332  -1.22    -0.584  -1.20 
 Born in province  yes = 1  -0.453  -1.18    -0.058  -0.09 
 Born in another rural area  yes = 1  -0.848  -2.39    -1.707  -2.22 
 Born in a town or city  yes = 1  2.804  1.09    3.745  3.20 
 Village dummies    (included but not shown)       
Sibling  effects           
 Number of brothers  log  -0.098  -0.53    0.525  0.47 
 Log (number of brothers) × log (land of father)    0.213  1.55    1.014  2.39 
 Log (number of brothers) × log (assets brought 
by  spouse)    -0.044 -0.92    -0.167 -1.15 
 Intercept    3.360  5.21    -3.967  -2.49 
 Pseudo R-squared    0.036      0.142   
 Number of observations    971      1,101   
 of which censored    86      675   
 of which uncensored    885      426   
            
   F-statistic p-value    F-statistic p-value 
Test whether sibling effects jointly significant    0.94 0.4196    2.38 0.0684 
a See text for details. 
 
 
In order to instrument βj in the groom equation (10), we need regressors that help 
predict assets brought to marriage by the bride E[βj] but not by the groom.  We cannot, 
however, use characteristics of the bride as instruments because, due to assortative 
matching, they may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the groom, and vice 
versa for the bride.  These considerations lead us to use as instruments the number of 
brothers and sisters of the newlywed.  From Table 5, we know that the number of 
brothers is not a significant determinant of the assets a person brings to marriage.  For the 26 
groom, we also include as instrument the number of children from previous marriages.  
As we have seen, this variable has a strong influence on assets brought to marriage for 
women, but it is not significant for men.  The instrumenting regressions are shown in 
Appendix Table 8.  Instruments are jointly significant for both groom and bride. 
Instrumented regression results are reported in Table 6.  Since the estimator is 
tobit, we adopt the Smith-Blundell approach to instrumentation and include the residuals 
from the instrumenting regression as additional regressors.  This procedure produces a 
test of endogeneity as a by-product.  We also report the results of a test of over- 
Table 6￿Instrumenting assets brought by the spouse 
  (estimator is tobit; dependent variable in log) 
   Groom    Bride 
  Unit Coefficient  t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Assets brought by spouse             
 Value of assets brought by spouse log  0.582  2.58    -1.476  -1.53 
 Residuals from Instrumenting equation   -0.349  -1.53    1.922  1.99 
Determinants of parental and personal wealth             
 Parent￿s wealth ranking  rank  1-5  0.249 2.38    0.447 1.89 
 Land of father 
a  log  0.101 0.93    0.419 1.80 
 Years of education of father  years  -0.234  -0.71    0.272  0.36 
 Age at marriage  years  0.012  1.22    0.002  0.08 
 Number of previous marriages  no.  times  0.037 0.42    0.234 0.92 
 Years of schooling  years  0.018  0.44    -0.102  -0.62 
 Years of farming experience  log  0.444  3.99    -0.066  -0.29 
 Years of wage work experience  log  -0.429  -2.71    1.420  1.65 
 Years of self-employment experience  log  0.130  0.96    0.957  2.09 
 Widowhood  no. times  0.208  0.97    1.869  3.71 
 Children from previous marriage(s)  number        0.325  3.80 
 Born in village    (omitted category) 
 Born in district  yes = 1  -0.308  -1.11    0.072  0.12 
 Born in province  yes = 1  -0.349  -0.89    0.408  0.59 
 Born in another rural area  yes = 1  -0.773  -2.11    -1.675  -2.16 
 Born in a town or city  yes = 1  3.508  1.36    6.590  3.42 
 Village dummies    (included but not shown) 
  Intercept    1.915 1.89    8.052 1.36 
 Pseudo R-squared    0.038      0.141   
 Number of observations    943      1,101   
 of which censored    83      675   
 of which uncensored    860      426   
            
   Wald   p-value    Wald   p-value 
Testing over-identifying restrictions    0.46  0.796    0.46  0.499 
Degrees of freedom    2      1   
           
Hausman test of endogeneity    2.65 0.104    2.60 0.107 
a See text for details. 27 
identifying restrictions and a Hausman test of endogeneity estimated on ordinary least 
squares.  In both cases, the over-identifying restriction test is satisfied.  Endogeneity tests 
suggest the presence of endogeneity in the bride regression only￿although the Hausman 
test is nearly significant for grooms when ordinary least squares are used instead of tobit 
(see bottom of Table 6). 
We again obtain strong positive estimated coefficients for assets brought by the 
bride in the groom￿s regression, hence rejecting the compensating parental transfer model 
without strategic behavior.  For brides, however, the coefficient is negative and nearly 
significant, suggesting that parents may reduce what they give to their daughter if the 
groom happens to bring more.  Both results￿positive and significant for the groom, 
negative but nonsignificant for the bride￿are quite robust:  they obtain if we drop or add 
regressors or use different sets of instruments. 
Testing Strategic Behavior 
As discussed in Section 2, there are two potential interpretations for the positive 
coefficient for grooms:  either (1) parental transfers do not compensate for assets brought 
by the spouse and all we observe is assortative matching; or (2) parents act strategically.  
To try to disentangle the two explanations, we construct a test of strategic behavior based 
on the idea that the slope of expected marriage-market outcomes should affect the 
behavior of parents who are acting strategically.  This is equivalent to saying that parents 
adjust transfers not only in response to assets brought by the spouse, but also in response 
to how easily they can obtain a better match. 
To show this formally, we amend the parental transfer model to include a slope 
effect.  Let the conditional expected match be written 
  E[β|µ] = g(µ). (12) 28 
In contrast with the compensating transfer model, we now assume that parents do not 
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Solving the first order condition yields a modified equation (4): 
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A similar condition can be derived from brides. 
To transform equation (13) into a relationship that can be used for estimation 
purposes, we take a first-order Taylor approximation of g(µ) around {µ°,β°}: 
  g(µ)    β° + g′(µ°)(µ - µ°). (14) 
We think of equation (12) as a linear approximation to the true matching relationship 
around the parental optimum with µ
* = µ° and β = β°.  The term g′(µ
*) measures the 
slope of the matching relationship at µ
*.  To simplify the notation, let κ stand for g′(µ
*), 
keeping in mind that κ varies across individuals, depending on the marriage market they 


























                                                 
22 In our model, g(µ) represents a marriage-market matching function, not a reciprocity motive, as 
discussed in Section 2.  The formal effect is the same, however: it raises assets brought to marriage. 29 
which again is linear in µ  and β.  The only difference is the presence of the (1 + κ)
σ 
term.  When the matching function is steep and κ is large, parents can significantly 
improve their child￿s marriage prospect by giving more: the coefficient of µ  increases in 
κ, while the coefficient of β decreases.  Given an estimate of κ for each bride and each 
groom, we could potentially evaluate equation (15) using nonlinear least squares.  As it 
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 can easily be approximated by a log-linear 
function of κ. 
To estimate equation (15), we need an individual-specific estimate of κ, the slope 
of the matching relationship.  If parents of the groom form rational expectations, E[β|µ] is 
equal to the actual matching relationship.  It is therefore possible to obtain an 
approximation to the slope of E[β|µ] from the empirical matching relationship.  To 
implement this idea, we divide the data into subgroups approximating the marriage 
market at a moment in time.  This is achieved by dividing couples within each village 
into cohorts, depending on the year in which marriage took place.  Because of data 
limitations, we split cohorts by decade.  A finer distinction would be better, but we do not 
have a sufficient number of observations for this to be practical.
23  Decades are calculated 
from the time of the survey, 1997.  So, marriages in Village 1 taking place between 1988 
and 1997 are regarded as belonging to one cohort; marriages in the same village taking 
place between 1978 and 1987 belong to another cohort, and so on.  A total of 15 × 4 = 60 
cohorts are distinguished.  For each cohort, we regress β on µ (in logs).  The estimated 
coefficient of µ in this regression is our slope variable κ.
24  Since κ is the same for all 
                                                 
23 Unlike Foster (1998), we do not have a complete census of marriages that took place. 
24 We also experimented with individual-specific slopes by regressing β on µ nonparametrically.  The slope 
parameter κj is then taken as the local slope of the nonparametric relationship in the vicinity of µj.  Because 
in this case κj ultimately depends on µj, there remains a possibility of endogeneity bias.  We therefore 
instrumented the κj estimates themselves, but this approach is quite cumbersome and opaque.  For these 
reasons, we ultimately decided to abandon the approach.  It is worth noting, however, that the approach 
yields results that are qualitatively very similar. 30 
grooms belonging to the same cohort, it is not correlated with µ and can be regarded as 
exogenous.
25 
Estimation results for equation (15) using the estimated κ￿s are presented in Table 
7.  Results are quite different for brides and grooms.  For grooms, the slope effect is 
negative and nonsignificant.  The value of assets brought by the bride retains a positive  
Table 7￿Including slope effects 
   Groom    Bride 
  Unit Coefficient  t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Assets brought by spouse             
 Value of assets brought by spouse log  0.540  2.26    -1.520  -1.58 
 Residuals from instrumenting equation    -0.306  -1.27    1.953  2.03 
 Slope of marriage market
a   -0.193  -0.60    2.266  2.41 
Determinants of parental and personal wealth             
 Parent￿s wealth ranking  rank  1-5  0.257 2.35    0.426 1.80 
 Land of father 
a  log  0.170 1.45    0.428 1.84 
 Years of education of father  years  -0.188  -0.53    0.307  0.41 
 Age at marriage  years  0.009  0.87    0.004  0.18 
 Number of previous marriages  no.  times  0.024 0.27    0.253 0.99 
 Years of schooling  years  -0.000  0.00    -0.090  -0.55 
 Years of farming experience  log  0.418  3.61    -0.079  -0.35 
 Years of wage work experience  log  -0.348  -2.08    1.489  1.72 
 Years of self-employment experience  log  0.112  0.77    0.995  2.18 
 Widowhood  no. times  0.338  1.50    1.859  3.70 
 Children from previous marriage(s)  number        0.318  3.72 
 Born in village    (omitted category) 
 Born in district  yes = 1  -0.252  -0.83    0.079  0.13 
 Born in province  yes = 1  -0.038  -0.09    0.412  0.60 
 Born in another rural area  yes = 1  -0.954  -2.34    -1.686  -2.18 
 Born in a town or city  yes = 1  3.490  1.32    6.563  3.42 
 Village dummies    (included but not shown) 
  Intercept    2.187 2.11    8.155 1.38 
 Pseudo R-squared    0.040      0.142   
 Number of observations    876      1,101   
 of which censored    80      675   
 of which uncensored    796      426   
            
   Wald  p-value    Wald  p-value 
Testing over-identifying restrictions    0.93  0.629    0.69  0.406 
Degrees of freedom    2      1   
           
Hausman test of endogeneity    1.80 0.180    2.60 0.107 
a See text for details. 
 
                                                 
25 The reader may worry that µ affects κ through the regression.  Technically speaking, it would be possible 
to estimate κj by dropping the jth observation from the regression.  In practice, because the number of 
observations in each cohort is relatively large, this does not make any difference. 31 
and significant coefficient.  In contrast, for brides, the slope variable has a significant 
positive coefficient, while the coefficient on assets brought by the husband remains 
negative and nearly significant.  These results indicate that strategic behavior is present 
only for brides. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the compensating transfer 
model presented in Section 2, the parents of grooms do not take marriage-market 
outcomes into account when they determine the assets brought to marriage by their child.  
It is as if parents first decide how much to endow their child and then look for a marriage 
prospect.  As a result, the data reflect primarily assortative matching.  This result is not 
altogether surprising, given that grooms bring around 10 times more assets than brides. 
The picture is different for brides.  In their case, the evidence suggests that parents 
give more if doing so improves the marriage prospect of their daughter, as predicted by 
our model with strategic behavior.  We also find some evidence that parents reduce 
transfers to daughters at marriage if the groom brings more, but this evidence is only 
significant at the 15 percent level. 
5.  Conclusion 
We have examined the determinants of assets brought to marriage.  These 
determinants, indeed, shape the distribution of assets and incomes in agrarian societies 
characterized by widespread poverty￿hence, where it is difficult to accumulate.  Assets 
at marriage also affect farm-size distribution, since newlyweds typically initiate their own 
separate farming operations.  Assets brought at marriage thus constitute the dominant 
form of start-up capital for new farms.  Earlier studies (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 
2003) provide ample evidence of assortative matching in rural Ethiopia.  They also show 
that assets brought to marriage depend on the wealth of the parents, particularly for first 
marriages, and the marriage histories of the bride and groom. 
Using a simple model of parental transfers (inter vivos bequest) at marriage, we 
identified three separate processes that potentially determine assets brought to marriage.  32 
The first process is assortative matching:  the tendency for wealthier brides to marry 
wealthier grooms.  Assortative matching, possibly reinforced by reciprocal gifts, 
generates a positive correlation between assets brought to marriage by both spouses.  The 
second process is compensating transfers:  the tendency for parents to reduce transfers at 
marriage if the spouse brings more.  Compensating transfers generate a negative partial 
correlation between assets brought to marriage once we control for the individual￿s 
characteristics.  The third process is what we called strategic behavior:  parents￿ attempt 
to improve the ranking of their children on the marriage market by transferring more 
assets to them at the time of marriage. 
We investigated these three processes using detailed data from rural Ethiopia.  
Our results suggest that different processes drive assets brought to marriage by grooms 
and brides.  We have already alluded to the importance of assortative matching 
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2003).  Regarding the two other processes, we find no 
evidence of compensating transfers or of strategic behavior for grooms.  Parents appear to 
endow sons based purely on their own preferences and endowments, and then look for a 
bride.  This is consistent with the fact that, in our sample, grooms bring, on average, 10 
times more assets to marriage than brides.  In contrast, for brides, we find some evidence 
of compensating transfers and strategic motives.  Parents seem to increase what they give 
to their daughter if the groom brings less.  They also tend to give more if doing so 
notably increases the quality of the match their daughter is able to secure in the marriage 
market. 
These results make sense in the context of rural Ethiopia, where grooms bring the 
lion￿s share of the new household￿s assets.  Grooms do not act strategically because the 
outcome of the marriage market is not an important determinant of their future welfare 
and can more or less be ignored.  For brides, however, much of their future welfare 
hinges on how they fare in the marriage market.  It is therefore not surprising if we find 
evidence that parents seek to influence the process and adjust what they give to their 
daughter as a function of marriage-market outcomes.  It remains to be seen whether 
similar behavior would obtain in other parts of the world.  In particular, we suspect that 33 
outcomes would be very different in economies with more off-farm income-earning 
opportunities for women.  In this case, imparting an education or vocational skills to their 
daughters may be a more effective way for parents to influence their future welfare 
(Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2003).
26  These issues deserve future investigation. 
 
                                                 
26 In the Philippines, for example, where abundant nonfarm earnings opportunities exist and there are no 
barriers to women￿s employment in those activities, parents invest in girls￿ education.  In Indonesia, female 
education has been increasing in tandem with the growth of nonfarm employment.  However, in rural 
Ghana, where these opportunities for women are rare, returns to female schooling are low or even negative, 
and parents do not invest in their daughters￿ education (Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2003). 34 
Appendix 
Table 8￿Instrumenting equations 
   Groom    Bride 
  Unit Coefficient  t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Exogenous  variables           
 Parent￿s wealth ranking  rank 1-5  -0.035  -0.35    0.025  0.26 
 Land of father 
a log  0.112  1.11    -0.015  -0.14 
 Years of education of father  years  -0.025  -0.08    0.258  0.86 
 Age at marriage  years  -0.025  -2.74    -0.011  -1.18 
 Number of previous marriages  no. times  -0.048  -0.55    0.007  0.06 
 Years of schooling  years  0.024  0.59    -0.040  -0.64 
 Years of farming experience  log  0.003  0.03    0.063  0.70 
 Years of wage work experience  log  0.309 2.26    0.220 0.63 
 Years of self-employment experience  log  0.049  0.38    0.058  0.30 
 Widowhood  no. times  -0.241  -1.12    0.009  0.04 
 Children from previous marriage(s)  number        -0.041  -1.12 
 Born in village    (omitted category) 
 Born in district  yes = 1  0.198  0.75    0.364  1.79 
 Born in province  yes = 1  -0.365  -0.99    0.343  1.32 
 Born in another rural area  yes = 1  -0.324  -0.95    0.145  0.47 
 Born in a town or city  yes = 1  -1.430  -0.58    1.567  2.93 
 Village dummies    (included but not shown) 
Instruments           
 Children from previous marriage  number  0.141  4.51       
 Number of brothers  number  0.044  0.94    0.124  2.50 
 Number of sisters  number  -0.033  -0.69    -0.077  -1.48 
 Intercept    3.595  5.92    5.998  12.49 
  R-squared    0.347     0.089  
 Number of observations    943      1,101   
            
   F-statistic p-value    F-statistic p-value 
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